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According to the theory of incomplete contracts, given nonveriﬁable entrepre-
neurial project choices together with divergent objectives between an entrepreneur
and its outside ﬁnancier, the entrepreneur can credibly pledge only part of its project
outcome for external funding. Meanwhile, entrepreneurial net worth must be put
as down payment to ameliorate agency costs.
In a real dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents and non-
veriﬁable project choices, endogenous agency costs signiﬁcantly change the business-
cycle pattern in the sense that the model can replicate an important empirical fact,
the ampliﬁed hump-shaped output behavior. Furthermore, variable asset prices can
aﬀect entrepreneurial net worth and then subsequently change the dynamic features
of aggregate output along business cycles.
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The balance sheet condition of indebted ﬁrms as well as indebted households is important
for the macroeconomic activity. A large body of literature derives credit constraints
from information frictions at diﬀerent stages of ﬁnancial contracting. The borrower has
information advantages on his project outcome or his own choices of project as well as
eﬀort, in comparison with the outside ﬁnancier. As those costs incurred could be so high
that it might be economically ineﬃcient for the lender to collect such information in all
states, she would like to induce the borrower to tell the truth or choose good projects or
exert eﬀorts by providing him with a reasonable share of the cake. Given nonveriﬁable
actions and divergent objectives of contracting parties, the project value is below the
ﬁrst-best level1, if each agent just maximizes its own objective. As the borrower can
credibly pledge only part of the project outcome for external funding, his net worth must
be put as down payment to ameliorate agency costs. Our paper is related with three
lines of research that incorporate moral hazards incurred at diﬀerent stages of ﬁnancial
contracting into the dynamic general equilibrium (hereafter, DGE) framework and study
the macroeconomic consequences of agency costs.
By bringing the problem of costly state veriﬁcation ` a la Townsend (1979) into a real
business cycle framework with overlapping generations, Bernanke and Gertler (1989) show
qualitatively that borrowers’ net worth plays an essential role in the optimal ﬁnancial con-
tracting under asymmetric information. The aggregate eﬀects of shocks to borrowers’ net
worth can amplify and persist. Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997, 1998) embed this mecha-
nism in a tractable real DGE framework for the quantitative analysis of the eﬀects of
agency costs on business-cycle dynamics. Their models replicate the empirical fact of
hump-shaped output behavior as documented in Cogley and Nason (1993), because
households postpone their investment several periods after the shock when agency costs
are at their lowest. Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) further bring in money and
price stickiness and show how credit market frictions may inﬂuence the transmission of
monetary policy in this ﬁnancial accelerator model.
Another line of research is initiated by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Kiyotaki (1998),
1The diﬀerence in the project value between the cases with and without information frictions is
normally called “agency costs”.
3who derive simple collateral constraints from the theory of inalienable human capital ` a la
Hart and Moore (1994). A positive productivity shock improves the borrower’s revenue
and then net worth, which enables these more productive agents to increase leveraged
investment in durable assets. Given ﬁxed stock, the excess asset demand of entrepreneurs
pushes up asset prices. It further improves the borrower’s net worth contemporaneously
and the enhanced credit boom helps allocate asset towards those more productive
borrowers. They show how the interaction of asset prices and credit limits becomes a
powerful transmission mechanism by which the output eﬀects of shocks persist, amplify,
and spill over to other sectors. By introducing the standard cash-in-advance constraint,
Cordoba and Ripoll (2004) reveal the role of collateral constraints in transforming small
monetary shocks into large persistent output ﬂuctuations. Following the modeling strat-
egy of Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), Vlieghe (2004) puts collateral constraint
in a standard new Keynesian sticky price monetary framework. As some of output vari-
ability is due to credit frictions, it may not be optimal for monetary policy to try and
achieve the ﬂexible-price level of output.
A third line of research assumes that hidden actions of the entrepreneur, e.g., his
nonveriﬁable choices of the project or the eﬀort level, can aﬀect project outcomes. Be
speciﬁc, if he chooses a bad project or shirk, the success probability of the project will
be low but the entrepreneur can have high private beneﬁts. As shown in Holmstrom
and Tirole (1997, 1998), the lender has to leave the borrower a reasonable share of the
cake in order to induce him to choose the project with high success probability or exert
eﬀorts to raise the success probability of the same project. As a result, the borrower
cannot credibly pledge all of the project outcome for external funding. By extending the
two-period model of Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) to the inﬁnite time horizon and adding
durable asset of ﬁxed total supply, Chen (2001) brings banks into the simple borrower-
lender relationship and explains why banking crises often coincide with depression in the
asset markets. Aikman and Paustian (2005) incorporate the bank model of Chen (2001)
in a standard dynamic new Keynesian framework and show optimal monetary policy in
the environment with credit frictions. After assuming liquidity problem of Holmstrom and
Tirole (1998) in capital production, Kato (forthcoming) shows the depressed hump-shaped
output behavior similar as in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) and pro-cyclical corporate
demand for liquidity.
41.2 Structure
This paper brings together ﬁrst two lines of research in a fundamentally modiﬁed model of
Chen (2001) and makes three contributions to the literature. First, we provide a real DGE
model with heterogeneous agents in which credit constraints are derived from nonveriﬁ-
ability of entrepreneurial project choice, as in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) and Chen
(2001). In contrast to depressed hump-shaped output behavior generated by Carlstrom
and Fuerst (1997) and Kato (forthcoming), our model produces ampliﬁed hump-shaped
output behavior due to capital reallocation among agents with diﬀerent productivity.
In order to show that asset prices can have amplifying eﬀects on aggregate activi-
ties, many models, including Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Kiyotaki (1998), Chen (2001),
Vlieghe (2004), and Aikman and Paustian (2005), stress the demand eﬀect on asset prices
by assuming ﬁxed asset supply for analytical convenience. The common results are that
the rise in asset prices in booms signiﬁcantly improves the net worth of credit constrained
agents and reduces agency costs. As a result, aggregate output responds more strongly
than in the ﬁrst-best case. In contrast, we assume that depreciable capital can be repro-
duced and its upward sloping supply curve are modeled by introducing ad hoc adjustment
costs, see Faia (2004). As the second contribution, we show that, in addition to amplify-
ing eﬀects, variable asset prices greatly change the dynamic features of output behavior.
That is, aggregate output reaches its peak earlier, if capital adjustment is more costly so
that asset prices respond more strongly to any excess demand. However, this result de-
pends crucially on the speciﬁc assumption of capital price formation. By combining Kato
(forthcoming) with the current model, Zhang (2005b) introduces variable asset price by
assuming nonveriﬁability of project choice in capital adjustment process instead of ad hoc
adjustment costs. The model with dual limited pledgeabilities generates more delayed
and ampliﬁed output responses to a productivity shock. In this sense, the modeling strat-
egy on capital price formulation does matter for the understanding of macroeconomic
ﬂuctuations.
As the third contribution, this paper makes many fundamental improvements over
its predecessors, Chen (2001) and Aikman and Paustian (2005). The contracts in their
models are neither debt contracts nor inherently consistent. In order to consist with the
standard features of debt contracts and the risk aversion of some agents, we change the
unit of account in the loan contracts and assume that the capital stock is fully destroyed
in a failed project and. Section 3 discusses these issues in detail.
5The internal mechanism is brieﬂy shown as follows. The risky projects of entrepre-
neurs are expected to be more productive than those safe projects of households, but
their project choices are nonveriﬁable. Entrepreneurial net worth has to be provided as
down payment in order to guarantee the lender’s interests. Due to credit frictions, a frac-
tion of capital is allocated ineﬃciently to those less productive agents, i.e., households.
If there is an exogenous positive shock on aggregate productivity (hereafter, TFP), the
rise in the entrepreneur’s revenue improves his net worth, which reduces agency costs for
loans. Entrepreneurs can increase their capital holding by leveraged investment. How-
ever, it still takes time for entrepreneurs to gradually accumulate net worth before they
can fully explore the proﬁtability of their projects. In addition to the TFP shock, the
tilting of capital allocation towards more productive agents also have amplifying eﬀects
on aggregate output. The speed of capital reallocation actually determines the shape of
output dynamics. As a result, aggregate output reaches the peak in a delayed fashion due
to endogenous agency costs and gradually-built entrepreneurial net worth. In order to
illustrate the internal mechanism more explicitly, we shut oﬀ asset prices by assuming no
capital adjustment costs. The one-to-one transformation of consumption goods to capital
goods guarantees constant asset prices over time.
In order to study how asset prices can aﬀect the dynamic features of output behavior,
we model the upward sloping capital supply curve by introducing ad hoc adjustment
costs. A positive TFP shock raises entrepreneurial revenue and spurs their investment.
Although the excess demand raises asset prices, the entrepreneurial user cost of capital
goods actually falls thanks to leveraged investment. In the meantime, the rise in asset
prices improves the contemporaneous entrepreneurial net worth. These two eﬀects jointly
result in more capital reallocation towards entrepreneurs with higher productivity in the
shock period and hence aggregate output reaches its peak relatively earlier than in the
case without adjustment costs. In this sense, asset prices not only amplify the eﬀects of
exogenous shocks on aggregate output but also change the its dynamic features.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 starts with an overview of the model
economy. Credit constraints are derived from nonveriﬁability of entrepreneurial project
choice. Agents’ optimization and relevant market clearing conditions jointly describe the
competitive equilibrium in our model economy. Section 3 revisits some essential contrac-
tual issues and lays out the benchmark model without moral hazard. After calibration,
Section 4 simulates the responses of the model economy with respect to TFP shocks under
diﬀerent scenarios. Section 5 concludes by collecting major ﬁndings.
62 The Model
2.1 Overview
Consider a discrete-time closed real economy with a continuum of heterogeneous agents of
unit mass, entrepreneurs and households. The population of entrepreneurs is η. Although
agents have a common discount factor, households are risk averse and inﬁnitely lived, while
entrepreneurs are risk neutral and each has a constant probability π of surviving to the
next period. At the end of each period, new entrepreneurs of mass η(1−π) are born and
replace those dying, which keeps the population of entrepreneurs constant2.
There are three goods: a capital good, an intermediate good, and a consumption good.
The intermediate good is produced from the households’ safe projects as well as from the
entrepreneurs’ risky projects by using capital as the sole input. A continuum of com-
petitive ﬁrms have the constant-return-to-scale technology to produce the consumption
good by employing the intermediate good and the household labor. Capital depreciates
at the rate δ and can be reproduced from the consumption good. The moral hazard
arises only in the entrepreneurial project choice. The consumption good is chosen as the
numeraire. There are four factor prices in the economy, the price of capital qt, the price
of the intermediate good vt, the wage rate wt and the deposit rate rt for households.
The time sequence of events is as follows. At the beginning of period t, intermediate
goods are generated from the projects installed at the end of period t−1. After the real-
ization of aggregate TFP shocks on the consumption good production, competitive ﬁrms
purchase intermediate goods at the price vt and employ households labor at the wage rate
wt to produce consumption goods. Those entrepreneurs with successful projects repay
the predetermined debt amount; as there is no output and capital is assumed fully de-
stroyed in a failed project, those unlucky entrepreneurs are simply released from their debt
obligations3. After receiving the signal of exiting the economy, the entrepreneurs of mass
2Because of agency costs, the entrepreneur prefer to accumulate net worth and postpone consumption
until no external funding is needed. Carlstrom and Fuerst (1996) and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist
(1999) handle this problem by imposing a constant death probability, where dying means liquidating
the net worth, consuming the proceeds, and exiting the economy. As an alternative, Carlstrom and
Fuerst (1997, 1998), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Kato (forthcoming) assume that the inﬁnitely-lived
entrepreneurs have a higher discount rate than households. Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001) explore the
diﬀerence in macroeconomic implications of two assumptions.
3Ex post veriﬁcation of project outcomes incurs no costs and so does debt enforcement as long as
there is positive outcomes.
71 − π consume all wealth and are replaced by newcomers of the same mass. Competitive
capital producing ﬁrms, owned by households, transform consumption goods to capital
and sell at the prevailing price qt. Any proﬁt incurred is lump-sum transferred to house-
holds. Each of the surviving entrepreneurs and newcomers receives a tiny endowment4
e and decide how much to consume, invest, and borrow. As the expected rate of return
of entrepreneurial net worth always exceeds the entrepreneurial rate of time preference,
risk-neutral entrepreneurs prefer to borrow to the limit, invest all net worth in the project,
and postpone consumption until they receive the signal of exiting the economy. In the
meantime, households make decisions on consumption, leisure, investment, and deposits
at the ﬁnancial intermediary.
2.2 Limited Pledgeability and one-period loan contracts
Entrepreneurs can invest capital in one of two risky projects at the end of period t. At
the beginning of period t + 1, both projects, “Good” and “Bad”, can yield R units of
intermediate goods per unit of capital invested if succeed, and zero if fail. Two projects
diﬀer in the probability of success and private beneﬁts for the entrepreneur5, as shown in
the following table,
Project Good Bad
Probability of Success pG pB
Private Beneﬁts bG bB
where 0 < pB < pG < 1 and bB > bG > 0 imply that project “Bad” is riskier but yields
more private beneﬁts for entrepreneurs than project “Good”. The capital in a failed
project is fully destroyed.
Entrepreneur i use his net worth ni,t and bank loans zi,t to purchase capital ke
i,t and
4The entrepreneurs must provide positive net worth as down payment of loans.
5It is a simpliﬁed version of the Principal-Agent setting in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997). In order to
model the divergent objectives between entrepreneurs and outside ﬁnanciers, the negative relationship
between private beneﬁts for the entrepreneur and the project success probability are commonly assumed
in the incomplete-contract literature. Private beneﬁts may refer to any noneconomic as well as economic
beneﬁts of running a project, e.g., ego, career concerns, large oﬃces or luxury cars. See Hart (1995) and
Tirole (1999) for relevant discussions. An alternative way is to assume that the entrepreneur’s eﬀort is
costly to herself but can raise the success probability of a project.
8invest in one of two projects6. Entrepreneurial project choice is nonveriﬁable but irre-
versible. Expected productivity of project “Good” is higher than that of household’s
home technology and only project “Good” is socially preferable, where rt is the gross rate
of deposit and Et is the expectation operator based on information available at period t,
pGEt[Rvt+1 + (1 − δ)qt+1] + bG
rt
− qt > 0 >
pBEt[Rvt+1 + (1 − δ)qt+1] + bB
rt
− qt
The bank provides loan zi,t to entrepreneur i at the end of period t against the promise
of repaying Rb
tke
i,t at period t + 1 if the project succeeds. If the project fails, zero project
outcome and fully destroyed capital imply zero return for both parties. In order to induce
the entrepreneur to choose project “Good”, the bank must provide enough incentives,
(pG − pB)Et[Rvt+1k
e






i,t] ≥ (bB − bG)k
e
i,t
which is simpliﬁed as
R
b




where ∆p ≡ pG − pB > 0 and ∆b ≡ bB − bG > 0. The expected return per unit of capital
invested in a successful project is Et[Rvt+1 + (1 − δ)qt+1]. According to Equation , the
entrepreneur can credibly pledge only Rb
t per unit of capital invested to the outside lender,
which is independent of his net worth or asset holding. Any promise more than Rb
t is not
trustworthy because the entrepreneur will deliberately choose project “Bad”.
Competitive banks act here as a simple device to pool the idiosyncratic risk of entre-
preneurial projects and we assume no moral hazards in banking sector7. The bank can
perfectly diversify her loan portfolio8 so that her ex post collected repayment coincides
with the expectation, which guarantees a sure rate of return for her risk-averse depositors,







The bank charges a bankruptcy premium 1
pG over the deposit rate rt.
The credit constraint takes a similar form as the collateral constraint in Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997). In their model, borrower’s inalienable human capital is unique and essential
for the project output. After the ﬁnancial contracting, he can always threaten to withdraw
6Entrepreneurs are heterogenous and indexed by i ∈ [0,1].
7In fact, one can assume that the risk-averse household can also perfectly diversify her direct lending
to entrepreneurs so that banks are not even needed.
8Chen (2001) studies bank capital by making an extreme assumption on the bank’s portfolio.
9his human capital so as to renegotiate the debt repayment down to the collateral value.
In this sense, any promised repayment exceeding the collateral value is not enforceable9.
In contrast, we assume the irreversible project choice and costless debt enforcement as
well as costless veriﬁcation of the ex post project outcome. The underlying moral hazard
problem arises only from the nonveriﬁable project choice.
Were the project choice perfectly veriﬁable, the entrepreneur would be able to pledge
all of the project outcome Et[(1 − δ)qt+1 + Rvt+1] for 100% external funding so that no
down payment is needed. As a result, capital would be all allocated to the entrepreneurs
of higher productivity and our model collapses to the standard RBC model. See Section
3 for detailed discussion on the ﬁrst-best economy.
2.3 Eﬃciency Conditions
2.3.1 Households
The problem of risk-averse households is quite conventional10. Each period, a household
is endowed with a unit of labor. The household sells her output of intermediate goods
G(kh
t−1) from the safe home project with capital kh
t−1 invested at the end of last period,
supplies labor lh
t to the production of consumption goods, receives lump-sum proﬁts from
capital production sector Πt, invests capital kh
t in the home project, deposits dt at the
bank for a secured rate of return rt, and consumes ch
t. The household maximizes the






























t + rt−1dt−1 + Πt
The household’s optimization over {ch
t,lh
t ,kh
t ,dt} gives the equilibrium conditions,























9An unsatisfying feature of their model is the extremely high leverage ratio.
10As households are homogenous, we use lower-case letters to denote relevant quantities of a represen-
tative household.
102.3.2 Entrepreneurs
Risk-neutral entrepreneur i maximizes the expected utility with respect to consumption
ce












where ˜ T is the stochastic time of death and B ∈ {bG,bB} is private beneﬁt per unit of
capital invested, subject to his period-by-period budget constraints and credit constraints,
qtk
e








where Ni,t denotes the post-repayment wealth of entrepreneur i. Ni,t = [(1−δ)qt +Rvt −
Rb
t−1]ke
i,t−1 if the project succeeds and Ni,t = 0 if fails. Due to the linear form of the project
technology and private beneﬁts as well as the entrepreneur’s linear preference, the capital
investment of surviving entrepreneurial i is linearly related with his post-repayment wealth
plus the endowment Ni,t+e. It facilitates aggregation among heterogeneous entrepreneurs
and only the ﬁrst moment of the distribution of entrepreneurial net worth has eﬀects on
aggregate economy. The heterogeneity in entrepreneurial net worth does not matter.
As the expected rate of return of entrepreneurial net worth exceeds their rate of time
preference, they always borrow to the limit with accumulated wealth and postpone con-
sumption to the period of death. We use lower-case letters without index i to denote per
capita quantities of heterogeneous entrepreneurs. Aggregate consumption and net worth





















































11as the entrepreneurial leverage ratio, the entrepreneurial user cost of capital, and the
discounted expected gross rate of return of entrepreneurial net worth by leveraged in-
vestment (entrepreneurial proﬁtability) respectively, which are all independent of entre-
preneur’s identity. Given the calibration of relevant parameters in Subsection 4.1, the
entrepreneurial proﬁtability signiﬁcantly exceeds the cost of external funds, Ψt > βrt.
2.3.3 Production of Consumption Goods and Capital Goods







logAt = ρlogAt−1 + t (2.10)
where Mt and Lt = (1 − η)lh
t denote aggregate input of intermediate goods and house-
holds labor respectively, while an exogenous productivity t has persistent eﬀects on TFP
At whose steady state value is normalized at unity. Without moral hazards, aggregate
production of consumption goods always takes place at the eﬃcient level and both factors
are priced at their marginal products,
vtMt = αYt (2.11)
wt(1 − η)l
h
t = (1 − α)Yt (2.12)
Capital depreciates at the rate δ and can be reproduced from consumption goods by
a continuum of competitive ﬁrms owned by households,
Kt − Jt = It − φ











t + (1 − η)k
h
t (2.14)
Jt = (1 − δ)(pGηk
e
t−1 + (1 − η)k
h
t−1) (2.15)
where Kt denotes aggregate capital stock at the end of period t, Jt denotes aggregate
stock of the remaining capital after the production of intermediate good at the beginning








Jt speciﬁes capital adjustment costs. Free from moral
hazard problems, these ﬁrms maximize the proﬁt with respect to It,
max
{It}




= 1 − 2φ
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Any proﬁt is transferred to households in a lump-sum form11.
2.4 Market Equilibrium
Market clearing conditions for intermediate goods, consumption goods, capital goods,
labor, and credit market are respectively,









t + It (2.18)
Kt − Jt = It − φ









Lt = (1 − η)l
h
t (2.20)
ηzt = (1 − η)dt (2.21)






t,nt} together with a set of prices {vt,qt,wt,rt,Rb
t} and the exogenous process
{At}satisfying equations (2.1)-(2.18).
3 Loan Contracts Revisited and the Benchmark Case
With respect to the contractual setting, our model diﬀers fundamentally from Chen (2001)
and Aikman and Paustian (2005) in the following three aspects.
First, Chen (2001) and Aikman and Paustian (2005) assume ﬁxed capital stock and
no depreciation. The contract between a bank and an entrepreneur is speciﬁed as follows.
The entrepreneur must deliver a predetermined share of the project outcome to the bank
in the form of intermediate goods and keep for himself the rest of the project outcome
as well as capital if the project succeeds; if fails, the project yields nothing and the bank
just captures the entrepreneur’s capital and hands over to the household. If we calibrate
their models so that the entrepreneurial leverage ratio is at the reasonable level, e.g., 2
as in Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), the ex post price of capital in the non-
stochastic steady state is so high that the liquidation value of capital in a failed project
11In the case of no adjustment costs φ = 0, the price of capital is constant at unity and there is no
proﬁt; while in the case of costly adjustment φ > 0, the price of capital is variable over time.
13even exceeds debt obligations. In other words, according to their contractual setting,
a bank actually gets more from a failed project than from a successful project, which
seems rather weird and is lack of sound arguments. According to the standard debt
contract, an entrepreneur with the failed project could repay the predetermined debt by
just liquidating the remaining physical assets and retain anything left, while the lender
should not get more than predetermined debt amount from liquidation. Dominated by
a standard debt contract, the contract in their models might not exist in equilibrium.
In contrast, as capital in a failed project is assumed fully destroyed in our model, the
entrepreneur just declares bankruptcy and is released from debt obligations.
Second, the contract in their models speciﬁes the share of the project outcome in terms
of the intermediate good for motivating entrepreneurs and banks to behave in a desirable
way. In fact, the entrepreneur can not only pledge his expected project outcome but also
his capital stock for external funding. In contrast, we specify loan repayment in terms
of the consumption good. According to our calibration, the entrepreneurial share of the
project outcome is in fact negative, R − Rb
v < 0 in the non-stochastic steady state. As
both entrepreneurs and households care only about consumption, it is the total pledgeable
value in terms of the consumption good that matters.
Third, according to the contractual setting in Chen (2001) and Aikman and Paustian
(2005), banks and entrepreneurs are provided with some shares of the project outcome in
terms of the intermediate good as incentives. As a result, households get the rest of the
project outcome as the deposit return. In the stochastic setting, variable prices of capital
and intermediate goods make the ex post deposit return in terms of the consumption
good diﬀer from the expected return in the deposit period. It does not matter in the
economy with all risk-neutral agents, e.g., in Chen (2001), but does matter in the economy
with some risk-averse agents, e.g., households in Aikman and Paustian (2005). As risk-
averse households only care about consumption goods, the deposit contract written in the
consumption good must dominate that written in the intermediate good.
According to the loan contract in our model, banks provide loans of zi,t−1 at the end
of period t − 1 to entrepreneur i for capital investment ke
i,t−1. If his project succeeds, he
repays the bank the predetermined debt amount
rt−1
pG zi,t−1 = Rb
t−1ke
i,t−1 after selling his
output of intermediate goods at the beginning of period t. His post-repayment wealth
is Ni,t = [Rvt + (1 − δ)qt − Rb
t−1]ke
i,t−1. If his project fails, he gets nothing Ni,t = 0.
At the aggregate level, the banks with perfectly diversiﬁed portfolio get total repayment
from entrepreneurs ηpGRb
t−1ke
t−1 with certainty, which guarantees the predetermined rate
14of deposit return for risk-averse households,





Consider the per capita post-repayment entrepreneurial wealth,
Nt = pG[(1 − δ)qt + Rvt]k
e
t−1 − rt−1zt−1








+ (1 − δ)(qt − Et−1qt) + R(vt − Et−1vt)]k
e
t−1
Variable prices of capital goods and intermediate goods imply that qt 6= Et−1qt and
vt 6= Et−1vt in the stochastic environment. In fact, the post-repayment wealth of risk-
neutral entrepreneurs acts as a buﬀer to insure banks and then their risk-averse depositors
against any aggregate shocks through loan contracts written in terms of the consumption
good12.
Consider the ﬁrst-best economy without moral hazards, where the entrepreneurial
project choice is perfectly veriﬁable at the date of contracting. As the entrepreneur can
now credibly pledge all project outcome for external funding, he does not have to provide
any down-payment. In equilibrium, all entrepreneurs invest in project “Good” and get
100% external funding. Furthermore, as the expected productivity of project “Good”
exceeds that of household home project, capital is fully allocated to entrepreneurs and
there is no heterogeneity in investment among them, ke
i,t = ke
t = Kt
η . By fully pledging
the project outcome and the remaining capital stock each period, the entrepreneur just
consumes his endowment each period and enjoys private beneﬁts from running project
“Good”, bGke
t. However, the contractual relationships among agents in the ﬁrst-best
economy is substantially diﬀerent from those in our model economy with moral hazard.
If an entrepreneur had pledged all project outcome to acquire external funding via the
loan contract Rb
t−1 = Et−1[(1−δ)qt +Rvt] for leveraged investment in project “Good” at
period t − 1, his post-repayment wealth at period t could be negative in the stochastic
framework even if his project succeeds, Nt = [(1 − δ)(qt − qt−1,t) + R(vt − vt−1,t)]ke
t−1. As
entrepreneurs even with successful projects would be unable to repay the predetermined
debt amount in those states with negative shocks, equity contracts replace debt contracts
in ﬁnancing the entrepreneurs’ projects. Be speciﬁc, the household invest dt−1 in banks
12The study on business cycles normally assumes that aggregate shocks are relative small so that the
economy always ﬂuctuates around its non-stochastic steady state. In our model, the stochastic shocks
are always so small that the entrepreneurs with successful projects can still repay even in the worst case.
15at the end of period t−1 for an contingent rate of return rt instead of the predetermined
rate of return rt−1 after the project outcomes are realized at the beginning of period t.




project “Good”. In return, banks have the right of collecting all of the project outcome
as well as the remaining capital if the project succeeds but zero if fails. After collecting
from entrepreneurs at the beginning of period t, banks transfer ηpG[(1 − δ)qt + Rvt]ke
t−1
to households. The ex post rate of return for the household’s ﬁnancial investment is
rt ≡




pG[(1 − δ)qt + Rvt]
qt−1
Here, risk-neutral entrepreneurs are unable to provide insurance for risk-averse households
against aggregate risks via standard debt contracts any more. In fact, the ﬁrst-best
economy is quite similar as a standard RBC model economy with some minor diﬀerence.






































vtMt = αYt (3.8)
wt[(1 − η)l
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t ] = (1 − α)Yt (3.9)
(1 − η)c
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Jt = (1 − δ)pGηk
e
t−1 (3.12)
Kt − Jt = It − φ
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= 1 − 2φ









logAt = ρlogAt−1 + t (3.15)
qtk
e
t = zt (3.16)
164 Dynamic Analysis
4.1 Calibration















and the marginal productivity is G0(kh








. The quarterly discount factor
β = 0.99 corresponds to an annual rate of interest of 4%; households labor supply in the
steady state L = 1
3 requires χ = 2.9; following Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997, 1998) and
Kato (forthcoming), we set σ = 1 and ψ = 0.
The share of intermediate goods in consumption good production α is set at 0.36, and
ρ is chosen at 0.95 as in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997, 1998) and Bernanke, Gertler, and
Gilchrist (1999). Capital depreciates at a quarterly rate of δ = 2.5%. As in Carlstrom
and Fuerst (1997), the quarterly rate of business failure at 1% implies pG = 0.99.
The proportion of entrepreneurs in the whole population is η = 0.5. Aggregate capital
stock K = 1.4 and the price of capital goods q = 1 in the non-stochastic steady state.
The values of {π = 0.6,R = 5.3, ∆b
∆p = 0.83} are jointly chosen to satisfy the following
conditions in the non-stochastic steady state. Entrepreneurs’ aggregate capital holding
accounts for half of total stock; the entrepreneurial leverage ratio Ω = 2, as in Bernanke,
Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999); entrepreneurial pledgeability is Rb
(1−δ)q+vR = 38%.
4.2 Simulation Results
We log-linearize the equation system governing the market equilibrium around its non-
stochastic steady state and employ the solution method provided by Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe (2004). Assuming no adjustment costs, subsubsection 4.2.1 compares the im-
pulse responses of our moral hazard model economy with those of the ﬁrst-best economy
and shows how gradually-built entrepreneurial net worth and capital reallocation among
households and entrepreneurs can explain the ampliﬁed hump-shaped output behavior
after a productivity shock. Under various degrees of adjustment costs, Subsubsection
13This function form implies that there is production externality from the entrepreneurs. The higher
the proportion of entrepreneurs’ aggregate capital holding is, the household’s marginal productivity will
be higher, too.
174.2.2 compares the impulse responses of two model economies and analyzes how variable
asset prices can aﬀect the dynamic features of aggregate output.
4.2.1 Constant Asset Prices: No Capital Adjustment Costs φ = 0
The impulse responses of the moral hazard economy (MH) and the ﬁrst-best economy
(RBC) with respect to an exogenous TFP shock are shown in Figure 1.
As mentioned in Section 3, the ﬁrst-best economy can be essentially described as a
standard RBC model. When an exogenous productivity shock hits the economy, house-
holds prefer to smooth consumption by accumulating capital. As there is no adjustment
costs, capital is one-to-one transformed from consumption goods so that asset prices are
constant at unity. As quite standard in RBC model, aggregate output reaches its peak at
the shock period and converges to its steady state level monotonically.
While, our moral hazard model replicates an empirical business cycle fact, the hump-
shaped output behavior. The mechanism is as follows. At the shock period t, the ex-
ogenous rise in TFP of consumption goods production increases aggregate demand for
intermediate goods. Given the ﬁxed aggregate supply due to predetermined investment,
ke
t−1 and kh
t−1, the price of intermediate goods rises to clear the market (vt > Et−1vt),
which improves the post-repayment wealth of entrepreneur i with a successful project,















Per capita entrepreneurial net wealth for investment Nt = πNt + e improves, too. By
leveraged investment, entrepreneurs have lower user cost per unit of capital invested than
households, µt = qt − zt
ke
t = 1 −
pGRb
t
rt < 1. In the shock period, the entrepreneurial user
cost falls because the rise in entrepreneurial pledgeability Rb
t exceeds that in the loan rate
rt. The fall in user costs together with the improvement in entrepreneurial net worth
enables them to increase the capital holding. The boom in the credit demand pushes up
loan rate. In the meantime, banks raise deposit rate and attract more deposits to such
an extent that the capital holding of households even falls.
The initial rise in entrepreneurial proﬁtability Ψt implies that entrepreneurial net
worth can yield higher expected return in the next period than that in the steady state.
The fact that the entrepreneurial proﬁtability stays above its steady state level in the
following four periods encourage entrepreneurs to invest more capital. As the entrepre-










































































































   Household Consumption       
Figure 1: Moral Hazard Model vs. RBC Model: Constant Asset Prices φ = 0
19is relatively cheap for entrepreneurs to invest capital goods in the project. As a result,
aggregate capital holding of entrepreneurs grows gradually to reach its peak in the fourth
period after the shock. Afterwards, the user cost rises above the steady state level, which
depresses aggregate entrepreneurial investment.
In Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) and Kato (forthcoming), moral hazard arises in the
intraperiod loan for capital production. As capital is an input for aggregate production,
the delayed capital production due to moral hazard results in the hump-shaped output be-
havior but at a depressed magnitude relative to that in a RBC model14. In contrast, there
are two forces driving aggregate output in our model: the exogenous shock with persistent
eﬀects on TFP and capital reallocation among agents with heterogeneous productivity.
Capital is allocated relatively more to entrepreneurs, as their net worth improves gradu-
ally. Although TFP in the third period after the shock is lower than that in the initial
shock period, aggregate output reaches its peak, because the contribution of the rise in
aggregate entrepreneurial capital holding to consumption goods production overcompen-
sates the eﬀects of the gradual fall in TFP. In this sense, our model generates the ampliﬁed
hump-shaped output behavior via an extra channel of capital reallocation.
4.2.2 Variable Asset Prices: Costly Capital Adjustment φ > 0
A large body of literature initiated by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) shows that a rise in
asset prices can improve the net worth of those credit-constrained ﬁrms and then enables
them to make more leveraged investment. By assuming ﬁxed supply of durable assets,
these models over-stress the responses of asset prices with respect to the change in asset
demand. Meanwhile, these models do not generate the hump-shaped output behavior.
In the previous experiment, we shut oﬀ the eﬀects of asset price on model dynamics by
assuming that depreciable capital can be reproduced one-to-one from consumption goods.
We now analyze the impulse responses of the model economy under diﬀerent degrees of
adjustment costs and show how variable asset prices can inﬂuence the dynamic features
of aggregate output. Given the degree of adjustment costs φ = 1, Figure 2 compares the
impulse responses of our moral hazard economy and the ﬁrst-best economy.






















































































































   Household Consumption       
Figure 2: Moral Hazard Model vs. RBC Model: Costly Asset Adjustment φ = 1
21As mentioned above, a positive shock on TFP increases aggregate demand for the in-
termediate good, which pushes up its price above the expectation, (vt > Et−1vt). The
excessive demand of entrepreneurs for capital pushes up its price due to costly adjustment
(qt > Et−1qt), which further improves entrepreneurial net worth, i.e., the collateral eﬀect
as stressed by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).
As long as entrepreneurial proﬁtability stays above its steady state level, entrepreneurs
prefer to invest more capital in their projects in order to take advantage of higher expected
return of net worth. Compared with the case of constant asset prices, the improvement
in entrepreneurial net worth due to the additional eﬀects of asset prices is much larger
in the shock period so that more loans are granted for entrepreneurs. The dramatic fall
in the proﬁtability of net worth in the following period implies that the proﬁtability has
been signiﬁcantly explored in the initial period. In this sense, the soaring asset prices in
the shock period actually change entrepreneurs’ investment pattern and consequently the
dynamic pattern of aggregate output via the mechanism of capital reallocation mentioned
before. That is, aggregate output reaches its peak in the second period after the shock,
earlier than in the case of constant asset prices.
For a better understanding of this mechanism, Figure 3 shows the impulse responses
of two economies in the case of φ = 10, where capital supply is more inelastic than in the
case of φ = 1. Asset price rises so high at the shock period that entrepreneurial net worth
improves greatly. The signiﬁcant improvement in entrepreneurial net worth enables them
to increase capital holding to such an extent that the price of the intermediate good in
the following period is depressed due to the huge rise in its supply. The entrepreneurial
proﬁtability peaks in the shock period and falls below the steady state thereafter, which
implies that the proﬁtability is fully explored in the shock period. As a result, the capital
holding of entrepreneurs peaks in the shock period and aggregate output just one period
after the shock. Our results hold under various calibrations of structure parameters.
5 Conclusion
We provide a real DGE model with heterogenous agents in which nonveriﬁability of en-
trepreneurial project choice justiﬁes credit constraints. We bring together two strands of
literature concerning credit market imperfections.
In the literature explaining the hump-shaped output dynamics, e.g., Carlstrom and
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Figure 3: Moral Hazard Model vs. RBC Model: Costly Asset Adjustment φ = 10
23It takes time for those credit-constrained agents, who produce depreciable capital, to
gradually accumulate net worth and ameliorate agency costs for leveraged investment.
As capital, an input for aggregate production, is then produced in the delayed fashion,
the responses of aggregate output to a persistent TFP shock has a depressed hump-shaped
form. In our moral hazard model without capital adjustment costs, aggregate output is
here driven both by TFP and by capital reallocation among agents with heterogenous
productivity. In fact, the gradually-built net worth of those credit-constrained agents has
the eﬀects on the process of capital reallocation and explains the ampliﬁed hump-shaped
output behavior here.
In the literature on the role of asset prices in amplifying the eﬀects of a small shock,
e.g., Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Chen (2001), aggregate stock of durable assets is
assumed to be ﬁxed for analytical convenience. The amplifying eﬀects of asset price on the
transmission mechanism in a credit-constrained economy is well explored, while the role of
asset prices in changing the dynamic pattern of output behavior has not yet been studied.
We choose costly capital adjustment as a vehicle to model the upward-sloping capital
supply curve. Asset prices have now strong eﬀects on the net worth of credit-constrained
agents. Given an exogenous positive TFP shock, the rise in asset prices improves the net
worth of those constrained agents in addition to the positive revenue eﬀect. It takes less
time for them to invest at the maximum. As a result, aggregate output dynamics are less
delayed.
Following the modeling strategy of Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), Kato (forthcoming)
derives credit constraints for those capital producing agents from nonveriﬁability of project
choice, too. Zhang (2005b) combines Kato (forthcoming) with the moral hazard model
here and study the interactions between intertemporal and the intratemporal loan con-
tracts ﬁnancing the production of intermediate goods and capital goods respectively. The
model with dual limited pledgeabilities and variable asset prices actually generates even
more delayed hump-shaped output behavior. In this sense, one cannot give a clear-cut
answer to whether variable asset prices can speed up or delay the responses of aggregate
output in our framework with limited pledgeability. It depends substantially on the spe-
ciﬁc mechanisms of capital supply. If one models asset price by just assuming ﬁxed asset
supply, he might miss the whole view of what asset prices can do.
24References
Aikman, D., and M. Paustian (2005): “Banks, their Balance Sheets and Optimal Monetary Policy,”
Working Paper.
Bernanke, B. S., and M. Gertler (1989): “Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Business Fluctuations,”
American Economic Review, 79(1), 14–31.
Bernanke, B. S., M. Gertler, and S. Gilchrist (1999): “The Financial Accelerator in a Quantita-
tive Business Cycle Framework,” in Handbook of Macroeconomics, ed. by J. Taylor, and M. Woodford,
vol. 1C, pp. 1341–1393, north-holland. Elsevier.
Carlstrom, C. T., and T. S. Fuerst (1996): “Agency costs, net worth, and business ﬂuctuations:
a computable general equilibrium analysis,” Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
(1997): “Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Business Fluctuations: A Computable General Equi-
librium Analysis,” American Economic Review, 87(5), 893–910.
(1998): “Agency costs and business cycles,” Economic Theory, 12(3), 583–597.
(2001): “Monetary shocks, agency costs, and business cycles,” Carnegie-Rochester Conference
Series on Public Policy, 54(1), 1–27.
Chen, N.-K. (2001): “Bank Net Worth, Asset Prices and Economic Activity,” Journal of Monetary
Economics, 48(2), 415–436.
Cogley, T., and J. Nason (1993): “Impulse dynamics and propagation mechanisms in a real business
cycle model,” Economics Letters, 43(1), 77–81.
Cordoba, J. C., and M. Ripoll (2004): “Collateral Constraints in a Monetary Economy,” Journal
of European Economic Association, 2(6).
Faia, E. (2004): “Ramsey Monetary Policy with Nominal Rigidities and Endogenous Capital Accumu-
lation,” .
Hart, O. (1995): Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Hart, O., and J. Moore (1994): “A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital,”
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109, 841–79.
Holmstrom, B., and J. Tirole (1997): “Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds, and the Real
Sector,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(3), 663–691.
(1998): “Private and Public Supply of Liquidity,” Journal of Political Economy, 106(1), 1–40.
Kato, R. (forthcoming): “Liquidity, Inﬁnite Horizons and Macroeconomic Fluctuations,” European
Economic Review.
25Kiyotaki, N. (1998): “Credit and Business Cycles,” Japanese Economic Review, 491(1), 18–35.
Kiyotaki, N., and J. Moore (1997): “Credit Cycles,” Journal of Political Economy, 105(2), 211–48.
Schmitt-Grohe, S., and M. Uribe (2004): “Solving Dynamic General Equilibrium Models Using a
Second-Order Approximation to the Policy Function,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control,
28(1), 755–775.
Tirole, J. (1999): “Incomplete contracts: Where Do We Stand?,” Econometrica, 67(4), 741–781.
Townsend, R. M. (1979): “Optimal Contracts and Competitive Markets with Costly State Veriﬁca-
tion,,” Journal of Economic Theory, 21(2), 265–293.
Vlieghe, G. W. (2004): “Imperfect Credit Markets and the Transmission of Marcroeconomic Shocks,”
Bank of England.
Zhang, H. (2005b): “Dual Limited Pledgeabilities and Macroeconomic Fluctuations,” memo, University
of Bonn,.
26